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April 26, 1968 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE 
84553 
THE U.S.S. "PUEBLO" 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, it is 
over 3 months since the Pueblo was 
taken j.nto custody and the American 
crewmembers were imprisoned by North 
Korea. Fifteen meetings have been held 
to date on this issue at Panmunjom. As 
spokesmen for the U.N. command in 
Korea, our military representatives have 
made demands for the release of the 
crew. The North Korean military repre-
sentatives have countered with charges 
and demands of their own. Back and 
forth has gone the football of recrimina-
tion. All the while, the Americans who 
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were aboard the Pueblo have remained 
in the custody of the North Koreans. 
The Pueblo incident should not be per-
mitted to recede from our attention. In a 
direct and immediate sense, there is a 
compelling and continuing responsib!l!ty 
to the crew members who are interned 
in North Korea. The return of these 
men-alive-ought to be, and is, the pri-
mary concezn of this Government. 
After all, it is no secret that the Pueblo 
was sent, on orders, into a position al-
most within sight of the North Korean 
coast. Those are misty waters where 
legal rights under international law skirt 
the shoals of obscure intelligence opera-
tions. The crew of the Pueblo was ex-
posed to great risks in the name of this 
Government. Owing to them, therefore, 
is every effort which this Government 
can make, and is making, to secure their 
release-! repeat--their release alive. 
As I see it, the problem with which we 
are faced is not so much to prove a legal 
point as to pry loose a crew. In dealing 
with the North Koreans, I would hope 
that the asseverations to sustain the for-
mer will not be made at the expense of 
the 'practicalities of the latter. 
Insofar as legalities are concerned 
may I say that from the information 
which has been made a·<allable in Wash-
ington and at the United Nations by 
Ambassador Goldberg, there is every 
reason to accept, and I do, the conten-
t ion that the Pueblo wa.s taken in inter-
national waters and, hence, not legally 
vulnerable to the seizure to which it was 
subjected. In this connection, we have, 
for example, the assurance of former 
Secretary of Defense Robert S. Mc-
Namara. In a joint interview with Secre-
tary Rusk on the TV program "Meet the 
Press" on February 4, 1968, he stated 
that the commander of the Pueblo "had 
the strictest of instruct.ions to stay in 
international waters" and further that 
"at the time of seizure, we are quite posi-
tive it--the Pueblo--was in international 
waters." 
However, Mr. McNamara in the same 
interview added : 
I tbJnk we c!Ulnot say beyond a sha.rlow or 
a doubt at no time during Its voyage It en-
tered North Korean wat.M's .... There was 
a period of radio alienee appropriate to Its 
mission !rom the period or roughly January 
10 to January 21 (In other words for about 
ten days prior to Its seizure) n.nd It Is In 
that period that we lack knowledge and wo 
will not be able to obtain knowledge or that 
until the crew and the commander are 
released. 
This observation su~gests that there 
could be facts beyond those presently 
known to us. These facts, I bel!eve, might 
conceivably place the Incident in a con-
text which would dif!er from our present 
understanding. In any event, some such 
contention apparently constitutes North 
Korea's alleged justification for the sei-
zure of the vessel. According to the North 
Koreans, moreover, it is a contention 
which is supported by crewmen of the 
ship, though, on the basis of correspond-
ence which I have received and other 
Senators have received, I doubt that the 
val!dity of the alleged contention by 
crew members very seriously. 
We do not, however, have to grope in 
the dark on this point. The unknowns in 
this Issue are not beyond the knowing. 
To know all the relevant facts, moreover, 
it may not be necessary to await the 
release of the crew and commander, as 
was suggested by both former Secretary 
McNamara and Secretary Rusk. There 
might be a preliminary way to clarifica-
tion which, in turn, could lead to a set-
tlement of the Issue. 
It involves, I should think, the tem-
porary suspending of the meetings at 
Panmunjom on the Pueblo matter. These 
meetings have been fruitless, in any 
event, insofar as gaining the release of 
the crew. The problem of the Pueblo is 
distinct from other questions of the 
maintenance of the military truce at the 
38th parallel, which is the primary con-
cern of the U.N. command-North Ko-
rean meetings at Panmunjom. In the 
first place, the issues of the Pueblo sei-
zure involve only U.S. personnel, not 
U.N. personnel. Moreover, the crew of 
the Pueblo, apparently, was not engaged 
in or even based in Korea. Finally, the 
United Nations Organization in New 
York which has ultimate responsibility 
for the U.N. operation in Korea and, 
hence, for participation in the talks at 
Panmunjom, has been unw!lling to con-
sider the matter of the Pueblo. 
In these circumstances, the negotia-
tions concerning the seized vessel and 
the release of its crew might be more 
effectively conducted in other diplomatic 
channels, as they undoubtedly are, 
rather than through U.N.-Korean com-
mand spokesmen at Panmunjom. It 
seems to me that the ne~tiations ought 
to be handled by representatives who 
speak exclusively, in this instance, for 
the United States. Indeed, it would ap-
pear most desirable ln this connection 
that North Korea be asked directly by 
this Nation to admit a special U.S. mis-
sion for the purpose of interviewing the 
interned crew members. In that fash-
ion, it should be possible to determine 
to our satisfaction what may have tran-
spired, during the days of radio silence, 
and any other relevant facts which 
have not heretofore been available. We 
would no longer be Mgot!ating, so to 
speak, in the dark. We would have the 
complete understanding of the situa-
tion which, as the former Secretary of 
Defense has frankly acknowledged, we 
do not have now. This understanding 
would provide a basis for a full and un-
emotional evaluation of all contentions 
surrounding the Pueblo incident. From 
that, it is conceivable that there might 
come a peaceful resolution of this m-
fated episode. 
If the release of the crewmen is the 
pnmary objective, and I know of no 
other of greater importance in the cir-
cumstances, this proposal to send a mis-
sion to North Korea will be made in all 
good faith. By the same token, if the 
North Koreans desire a rational settle-
ment of this issue, they will accept it In 
all good faith. 
A settlement of that kind is in the in-
terest of the Korean people and the peo-
ple of the United States. The festering 
of the unresolved issue of the Pueblo can 
only lead to gathering complications. 
There is already a growing edginess 
along the truce line which has brought 
patrol clashes and ca.sualt!es. The 38th 
parallel in Korea is becoming, once 
again, one of the world's most volatile 
frontiers. One would hope that the 
Pueblo incident, which is an incidental 
but, undoubtedly, a contributing factor, 
can be settled while there is st!ll time. 
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that certain remarks I made at the 
University of Maine on February 11, 
1968, relative to the Pueblo, and also an 
editorial published in yesterday morn-
ing's Los Angeles Times, entitled "The 
U.S. Options in Korea," be printed in 
the RECORD at this point. 
There being no objection, the material 
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, 
as follows: 
SPEECH or SeNATOR MIKE MANsll'lELD, DEMo-
CRAT, Or MONTANA, AT THE UNIVJ:RSrrY OF 
MAXNJ: CONVOCATION, ORONO, MAmli:, F'zBBU-
ARY 11, 1968. 
My remarks, today, deal with VIet Nam. 
Before proceeding to them, however, I w18h 
to re!er to the USS Pueblo Incident. When 
added to the Vietnamese conflict, It Is lllus-
tratlve of the hydra-beaded c~racter of 
military Involvement> on the mal.nland of 
Asia. War spreads readUy on that continent; 
the dll!lculty Ilea In curbing !t. I would em• 
phas!ze, therefore, that while the urgency 1n 
VIet Nam Ill to bring one bloody confllct to a 
close, the Imperative In Korea Is to prevent 
the opening of another. 
In the la.tter oonnect!on, It will help to 
bear In mind the eesentlals or the PueblO 
a.tfalr. A U .S. vessel-that It W88 a.n elec-
tronic llatener of 90me BOrt Is not d.!.apuied--
was In a post t1on off the North Korean ooast. 
What vital national need prompted the d.IB· 
pa.tch of th!B part!culu mlssion or why the 
ves&el went undefended are not as yet, fully 
known. 
All reports ava.l.la.ble to me In both the 
WbJte House a.nd the Foreign Rela.t!ona Com-
mittee, Indicate that the Pueblo was In tn-
temat!onal water~~ at the time It W9S taken. 
AIJ of the moment, the Pueblo Is now at a.n-
chor In Wonsa.n harbor a.nd the 82 Blll'Viving 
crewmen who were aboa.rd.-<me other has 
died-are Interned In North Korea. That In-
eluctable !act !.s In no way altered by ueru;e 
ot outrage or lndign.a.t!an. 
The crew aboard the Pueblo was carrying 
out a dangerous assignment. The "why" and 
the "how" ot the mission are moot at th.l.6 
point. What mattem now Is the obltgat!on to 
those men. In our roo.ctlons to the Pueblo 
affair, llvee must not bedome the pawns of 
e! ther pride or petulance. Every effort to 
bring about their release must be made. 
We will a.l90 do well to bea.r In mind that 
the one war In whlch we are engaged on the 
Asian mainland has become a eouroe of Im-
mense grief. Any move whlch loods Into a 
second VIetnamese-type conflict In Korea will 
oompound the grle! but hardly serve the in-
tere6t:s or thJs nation. • 
In sum, what moot matters at th!B point, 
It Sjlems to me, !.s: ( 1) return of the 80-odd 
American crewmen allve--1 repeat, a.I!ve--
and; (2) prevention of a seoond war In Korea 
on the pattern or VIet Nam which could the 
more readily booome World War Ill. 
The finn re6tra.Int whlch Pree!dent John-
son ll8.8 exercised from the outaet of the 
Pueblo a.tralr has set a wi!Ml course for th!B 
nation The que6tlon has been rn!Bed at the 
United Nations Security CouncU by Ambas· 
sa.ctor Arthur Goldberg It ha.s been pursued 
at the Pnnmunjom truce site In d.!.scuss!ons 
between our repre.;entatlves !Uld those ot 
North Korea. Other channels are also being 
tapped which might lead to the release of the 
crewmen. In short, the President's pollcy at 
this time Is to seek a solution by diplomacy. 
It Is the course of prudence a.nd reason in 
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what Is, at best, a delicate and dangerous slt-
uat.lon. It deserves every suport of the nation. 
There Is no certainty that the present ef-
forts will bear fruit. Other possibilities, how-
ever, may also be available. I would point out, 
for example, that, if necessary, the ma.tter 
should be pressed further at the United Na-
tions which h~s had a definite responslblllty 
in Korea for almost two deCCLdes. If it comes 
to th.>t, it mny be feasible to seek Impartial 
arbitration or mediation or a pre.qentation 
of the entire matter to the World Court. May 
I say that precedent !or the lntter procedure 
is to be round ln a similar dlspu te two dec-
ades ago over the loss or two BritiSh destroy-
ers off the Albanian Coast. 
Whatever the specific recourse, In my judg-
ment, the efforts to find a peaceful solution 
In the Pueblo affair are attuned to this na-
tion's Interest. What matters In my judgment 
Is saving lives, not saving f<l.Ce. What matters 
is the substance not the shadow of thls na-
tion's Interests. • • • 
[From the Los Angeles Times, Apr. 25, 1968] 
THE U.S. OPTIONS IN KOREA 
The continuing series of ambushes staged 
by the Communists within and below the 
Korean demilitarized zone has taken a steady 
toll of American and South Korean Jives, fed 
tensions between Seoul and Washington, 
and lett the North Koreans, who contemptu-
ously r<>fuse to acknowledge any participa-
tion In the bloodletting, virtually unmarked. 
The Incidents, In short, have served the 
pw·poses for which they have been mounted. 
And they have demonstrated agaln the Im-
potence of U.S. power In the face of relatively 
low-level but still flagrant acts of aggression 
by a minor state. 
Pyongyang has had a number of clear mo-
tives In it.s escalated efforts dlrected south-
ward since the beginning of the year: 
It has kept alive the threat a! a second-
trout war In Asia.; 
It has created dlv1slons between South 
Koren.ns, who want to react in kind, and the 
United States, which feels It must pursue a 
n1uch more cautious policy; 
It hWi embarrassed the strongest mlli tary 
power In the world; and 
It has ra.lsed doubts about security In 
South Korea. 
For the United States the greatest inhibi-
tion on the kind of retaliatory action that 
would best reaasure the South Koreans and 
possibly most dlssuade the Communist. has 
been the confinement In North Korea for the 
last three months of the 82-man crew of the 
captured USS Pueblo_ 
U.S. efforts have been directed, witl1 abso-
lutely no success, toward obtaining freedom 
of the crew through political talks. The 
Communists have been demanding a full 
apology for the alleged Intrusion by the 
Pueblo In to their territorial waters, which 
would be an admJ.ssion o! the rightness of 
tl1eir c~e. Meanwhile. they have been sha.me-
lcssl.y and brutally exploiting the plight of 
the captives for the most callous propaganda 
purposes. 
The op.tions available to the United States 
are rew. 
This count-ry can do what It has been 
doing, I.e., try to negotiate the crew's release, 
at the same time tolerating without re!Ktlla-
tlon Communl't mnrau<llng along the DMZ. 
It can meet tho North Kore~>n <lctnl\ntl rmd 
1\.fH.•hlgll'n, hnplug to RCt t.h<.! cn,w hack n.nfl 
tit ttn I'IJilHIVn l'yOil!l .Vn llf(ll ~~t ronv,''!.t. Wt"npon 
ttgtt.lnet. rot.nllul.ory n.t:U•H~ Cnr LIHJ l>ot'd1·r uto-
bushes. But there Is no guarantee that even 
an abject apology would win freedom for 
the men. 
Or it could respond to the border killings 
by taking severe steps of Its own, In con-
junction with the South Koreans. such ac-
tions could, however, doom the Pueblo's 
crew. 
None of these options Is attractive. 
But neither Is the probability of contin-
uing attacks on U.S. and South Korean 
troops along the DMZ by a. regtme which 
feels immune from any punitive response so 
long as it holds 82 Americans hostage. Those 
lives are lmportrmt to this country. But so, 
too, Is freedom of action to respond ade-
qucttely to North Korean viciousness. Wash-
Ington may soon have to make the hard 
choice. 
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